2. Theory of Equalizing Differentials. Consistent with the Indian marriage market, I assume that marriage decisions are made by the household of each potential spouse. I further assume that the groom's household maximizes a utility function that includes as arguments, a numeraire good X and a vector of n desirable traits of the bride and her household B; more formally

(1) U = U(X,B;G,α^G)  U'>0  U''<0

where G is a vector of socio-economic characteristics of the grooms and his household, and is a parameter that differs from household to household (tastes). The groom household is assumed to maximize the utility function in (1) by choosing X and B, subject to a budget constraint that includes a nonlinear hedonic dowry function, which maps the traits of potential brides and grooms to a transfer value, viz.:

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