6. Conclusions. In this paper, I have used data from a retrospective sample survey in the north and south of India to estimate a model of dowry exchange and groom selection. When considering dowry as a marriage payment, the question is "What the bride's parents pay for in the marriage market?" An important contribution of this paper is that the marriage market can be viewed as an implicit market in bride and groom attributes. The resulting market equilibrium associates a price with each match. The set of dowries and the measurable attributes and characteristics associated with all such matches are the equalizing differences observed in the market. Dowry is then the price of a good match in the marriage market.

The results support the hypothesized, equalizing differences, role of marital arrangements. Measurable groom characteristics on which compensating price differentials have been shown to arise empirically include groom's age at marriage, education and height. The results also indicate that status of the groom's household is a valued trait; grooms from higher socio-economic strata command higher dowry, although in the case of wealth, the results were less conclusive.

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