|
In this essay, I
use data from a retrospective sample survey in rural north and south India to
develop and test a framework capable of explaining dowry exchange and groom
selection in India. I adapt Rosen's implicit market model to the Indian
marriage market. When considering dowry as a marriage payment, the question is
"What the bride's parents pay for in the marriage market?" An important
argument of this paper is that the marriage market can be viewed as an implicit
market in bride and groom attributes. The resulting market equilibrium
associates a price with each match. The set of dowries and the measurable
attributes and characteristics associated with all such matches are the
equalizing differences observed in the market. Dowry is then the price of a
good match in the marriage market. The empirical results strongly support the
hypothesized, equalizing differences, role of marital arrangements. Measurable
groom characteristics on which compensating price differentials have been shown
to arise empirically include groom's age at marriage, education and height. In
regions more to the north, dowries on average were higher. Most importantly,
contrary to popular belief, empirical results indicate that, holding groom
characteristics constant, real dowries have decreased over time. In estimating
the parameters of the demand function for a set of groom characteristics, an
identification problem is created by the simultaneity of prices and quantities.
By an instrumental variable approach consistent parameter estimates are derived.
Results show that the most important determinants of demand for various groom
attributes are price of the attribute, bride's traits and the socio-economic
status of the bride household.
|
